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Notes
THE REEMERGENCE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
IDEAS IN THE 1994 FRENCH BIOETHICS
DEBATES
NAN T. BALL
France has a unique and strong position in the realm of the Rights of
Man that the biological sciences and their progress threaten to
disrupt. This position stems from Enlightenment thought . . . .
Senator Franck Sérusclat

1

But why do you judge so precipitately? Can you be ignorant how
widely human nature differs from itself? How opposite its
characteristics? How prejudice and manners vary according to times,
places, and age? Who is it that can prescribe bounds to nature and
say, Thus far shall thou go, and no farther?
Jean-Jacques Rousseau

2

INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 1994, Philippe Séguin, president of the French
National Assembly, asked the Constitutional Council to examine
three bioethics laws that restricted access to artificial reproductive
technologies (ART) to sterile, heterosexual couples of childbearing

Copyright © 2000 by Nan T. Ball.
1. LES SCIENCES DE LA VIE ET LES DROITS DE L’HOMME 419 (1992) (“La France a une
situation singulière et forte dans le domaine des Droits de l’Homme que les sciences de la vie et
leurs progrès menacent de bousculer. Elle est issue de la réflexion du siècle des Lumières.”).
2. JULIE OU LA NOUVELLE HÉLOÏSE 738 (René Pomeau ed., Garnier Frères 1960) (1761)
(“Pourquoi décidez-vous ainsi? Savez-vous jusqu’où les hommes diffèrent les uns des autres,
combien les caractères sont opposés; combien les moeurs, les préjugés, varient selon les temps,
les lieux, les âges? Qui est-ce qui ose assigner des bornes précises à la nature, et dire: <<Voilà
jusqu’où l’homme peut aller et pas au delà>>?”).
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age.3 In order to judge the constitutionality of the laws and
underscore the sanctity of the human body, the Council referred to
France’s 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.4 In so
doing, the Constitutional Council explicitly linked the bioethics
questions of today with the eighteenth-century French Enlightenment
tradition.
This Note will argue that the action of the Constitutional Council
is but one example among many of the ways in which the form and
language of the legal debates surrounding ART in France echo
5
Enlightenment ideas. Close analysis of the 1994 French bioethics
debates suggests that Enlightenment polemics about the
interrelationship between family, nature, and society provided much
of the groundwork for those debates. Through a joint analysis of the
French laws and the literary and political tracts of Enlightenment
thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau, this Note demonstrates that the
questions posed by Enlightenment philosophers were reformulated in
the bioethics debates with a new sense of urgency.
To date, the 1994 French bioethics debates have largely been
analyzed through a contemporary political eye. This Note, however,
analyzes the 1994 bioethics laws through a literary and historical lens.
By means of an interdisciplinary approach, this Note will provide a
broader intellectual context for thinking about the bioethics laws and
the evolution of French ideas concerning the family and nature. Part I
3. See Thierry Bréhier, M. Séguin souhaite la constitutionnalisation de la protection du
corps humain, LE MONDE, June 30, 1994, at 8; see also Law No. 94-654 of July 29, 1994, J.O.,
July 30, 1994, p. 11,062; D.S.L. 1994, 29, 411 (defining ART as “clinical and biological practices
that permit in vitro fertilization, the transfer of embryos, artificial insemination and all
technology with equivalent effects that enable procreation outside of the natural process”).
4. See Noëlle Lenoir, French, European, and International Legislation on Bioethics, 27
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1249, 1265 (1993). “In reviewing this legislation, the [Constitutional]
[C]ourt, for the first time, asserted the constitutional value of the principle of human dignity as a
protection against dangerous scientific practices.” Id. at 1260.
“Constitutional review in France is not undertaken for the sake of striking down law,
but more as a consultative device, where an inquiry is made to the council and ameliorations to
the law are suggested.” Jonathan F.X. O’Brien, Cinderella’s Dilemma: Does the In Vitro Shoe
Fit?, 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 525, 527 n.10 (1998). In a 1971 decision, the Constitutional
Court established that it could refer to the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen to
judge the conformity of the legislation to the French Constitution. See id. at 528 n.15.
5. Other contemporary scholars have also described the phenomenon of the
reformulation of Enlightenment ideas in the twentieth century. Christie McDonald, Professor of
Romance Languages and Literature at Harvard University, has extensively explored related
themes. See, e.g., Christie McDonald, Opérateurs du changement: De Miss Polly Baker à
Murphy Brown, 19 OEUVRES ET CRITIQUES 69, 69 (1994) (discussing “the relationship between
our time and possible rereadings of the eighteenth century”).
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will examine the role various government agencies and institutions
played in the formation of the bioethics laws. Part II will demonstrate
that French Enlightenment ideas about the close relationship
between the well-being of family and society were reformulated and
transmuted during the contemporary French bioethics debates. Part
III will discuss how the French legislators, like the eighteenth-century
philosophers Rousseau critiqued, unquestioningly invoked the
authority of “nature” to support restricting access to ART and will
argue that this attempt to use nature as a sort of unimpeachable
ultimate ethical arbiter can be understood as a selective and
transforming interpretation of Enlightenment ideas about nature.
Finally, Part IV will suggest that Rousseau, himself a writer of both
political tracts and novels, bequeathed not only certain ideas about
the questions of family and nature to the twentieth century, but also
an important means of conceptualizing and examining ethical
questions outside of the constraints of legislative consensus: the
novel.
I. LEGISLATING BIOETHICS IN FRANCE
This Part will examine some of the contemporary social and
political forces that underlie the French legislature’s decision to
restrict access to Artificial Reproductive Technology (ART). The
bioethics laws that the French National Assembly passed on July 9,
1994 allow only sterile, heterosexual couples of procreative age to use
6
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization procedures. These
restrictions were instituted, in part, to control the threat the
legislators thought these technologies posed to the traditional family
structure.7 The unprecedented availability of ART at the end of the
twentieth century appeared to further undermine the predominance
of the traditional heterosexual, bi-parental family structure because
the technology enabled homosexual couples, virgins, and post-

6. See Law No. 94-654 of July 29, 1994, J.O., July 30, 1994, p. 11,062; D.S.L. 1994, 29, 411.
The CCNE reexamined the 1994 bioethics laws on June 25, 1998, and reaffirmed that
[c]onditions of access to medically assisted reproduction are based on a choice made
by society to the effect that the interests of the unborn child are best served by being
born and growing up in a family made up of a heterosexual couple. Changes in moral
attitudes in the last five years do not seem to justify any modification of these
conditions. At this point, therefore, CCNE is not proposing any modification.
CCNE, Opinion No. 60: Reexamination of the Law on Bioethics, http://www.ccneethique.org/english/avis (last visited Sept. 6, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
7. See infra Part II.
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menopausal women to have children.8 Unwilling to allow such
technological advances to fundamentally alter cultural norms, the
French legislature restricted access to ART by championing a
9
normative model of the family.
A. Historical Background
Various forms of artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization
have existed for over two hundred years.10 For example, Arnaud de
Villeneuve reportedly attempted to artificially inseminate the wife of
Henry IV during the sixteenth century.11 In 1790, an English doctor
named John Hunter injected sperm into the womb of a woman
12
incapable of sexual intercourse. In vitro fertilization has been
successfully used for the eugenic breeding of animals since at least the
nineteenth century.13 It was not until 1978, though, that the first
human baby, Louise Brown, was born as a result of an in vitro
14
fertilization process in the United Kingdom. The first French “test
tube” baby (bébé éprouvette) was born four years later on February
15
24, 1982. Soon after, the technology developed to freeze embryos
and store them for relatively long periods of time before reimplanting them in the womb.16
Both the church and the government in France condemned ART
17
as immoral through much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
In 1880, a tribunal in Bordeaux described artificial insemination as
“repugnant to natural law” (“répugnante à la loi naturelle”).18 The
Saint-Office of the Roman Catholic Church condemned the
technology in 1897, as did the Protestant Archbishop of Canterbury

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See IRMA ARNOUX, LES DROITS DE L’ÊTRE HUMAIN SUR SON CORPS 88 (1994).
See id.
See JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN & CATHERINE LABRUSSE-RIOU, PRODUIRE L’HOMME:
DE QUEL DROIT? 26 (1987).
13. See id. at 25.
14. See id. at 63.
15. See Anne Fagot-Largeault, In France, Debate and Indecision, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
June 1987, at 11.
16. See ARNOUX, supra note 10, at 481. In 1986, two babies were born at the Hospital
Béclère after the embryos from which they developed had been frozen for two months. See id.
at 481 n.2.
17. See BAUDOUIN & LABRUSSE-RIOU, supra note 12, at 27.
18. Id.
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in 1948.19 In 1949, the French Academy of the Moral and Political
Sciences condemned artificial insemination for its “attack on the
foundations of marriage, the family, and the state.”20
1. Government-Sponsored Sperm Banks. Because of this
strongly held moral opposition to ART, French hospitals did not
officially provide artificial insemination services for much of the
21
twentieth century. The procedure was still practiced secretly,
however, in some doctors’ offices and in private quarters.22 There is
evidence that 1500-2000 French women might have secretly
undergone artificial insemination during the 1970s.23 The first
officially sanctioned human sperm banks began to appear around the
world in 1963, first in the United States, Japan, and Israel, and then
24
finally in Europe. France established its first government-sponsored
sperm banks in 1973.25
Professor G. David of the Bicêtre Hospital in Paris worked on
improving the efficacy and safety of the long-condemned artificial
26
insemination technology. He also created some of the first official
ethical guidelines for the donation and use of sperm.27 Because of
Professor David’s efforts, the CECOS (Center for the Study and
28
Conservation of Eggs and Sperm) was established in the early 1980s
to harmonize and regulate the practices of all French sperm bank
centers.29 The CECOS played an important role in the development
of the recent bioethics legislation because its guidelines formed the
19.
20.

See id.
NOELLE LENOIR, 1 AUX FRONTIÈRES DE LA VIE: UNE ÉTHIQUE BIOMÉDICALE À LA
FRANÇAISE 28 (1991) (“<<une atteinte aux assises du mariage, de la famille et de la sociJtJ>>”
(quoting l’AcadJmie des Sciences morales et politiques)).
21. See id. at 27-28.
22. See Nicolas Herpin, Obstacles to Sperm Donation in France, in THE ETHICS OF
MEDICAL CHOICE 48, 57 (John Elster & Nicolas Herpin eds., 1994).
23. See id. at 58.
24. See Katia Szleper, Risques et responsabilités médicales dans les nouvelles technologies
de la reproduction humaine 122 (1996) (unpublished Docteur en droit dissertation, University
of Paris VIII) (on file with author).
25. Professor A. Netter, Head of Endocrinology and Reproduction, Minister of Health,
and Professor G. David, Professor of Biology and Reproduction, organized banks at the Necker
and Kremlin-Bicêtre hospitals in Paris, respectively. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 125. The French title of the organization is the Centre d’Étude et de
Conservation des Oeufs et du Spermes. See id. at 122.
29. See id. at 125.
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basis of various government reports submitted to the legislature on
the subject of bioethics.30 The CECOS reports were the first to
recommend officially that ART only be made available to sterile
heterosexual couples who could provide a “normal environment” for
the future child.31
2. ART Use at the End of the Twentieth Century. More than
10,000 children have been born in France using artificial reproductive
32
techniques since 1982. The structure of the French health system
helps explain this recent widespread use of in vitro fertilization
technology.33 The eleventh section of the preamble to the 1946
Constitution makes the French citizen’s access to health care a
34
constitutional right. This section affirms that the state must insure
that “the child, his mother, and all persons, have access to health
care.”35 Accordingly, the government health system reimburses
36
The French
French citizens for all medical expenditures.
government normally reimburses medical procedures up to 80%, but
in the case of infertility diagnosis and treatment, the national health
insurance system covers the cost of the entire process.37
Even though increased ART use has recently become a source of
anxiety, initially the state actively extended access to the technology.
A 1978 law intended to encourage the birth of children instituted this
complete coverage of ART in France.38 The law was passed as a
means of reversing the trend of decreasing birthrates during the
39
1970s —a trend that had also led to a resurfacing of old natalist
rhetoric.40
30. See id. at 126.
31. See id. at 125-26.
32. See ARNOUX, supra note 10, at 475.
33. See Lenoir, supra note 4, at 1252.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See Fagot-Largeault, supra note 15, at 10.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Natalist rhetoric was very prominent in France after the birth rate was almost cut in
half following World War I. See WILLIAM H. SCHNEIDER, QUALITY AND QUANTITY 119
(1990). Various measures were taken by the government to counteract this trend. On July 31,
1920, a law was passed banning abortion. See id. at 120. Prizes were awarded to large families.
See id. Politicians bragged about how many children they had in campaign literature. See id. at
119. Furthermore, a center was founded in Strasbourg for the sole purpose of helping young
married couples raise children. See id. at 124.
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The housing of ART in institutions such as the CECOS and the
public health system helped attract the attention of the general public
to the potential of the technology. Even though biomedical
techniques like artificial insemination had been in use for over one
hundred years, the twentieth-century institutionalization of ART and
improvements in the technology itself helped make the techniques
41
appear threatening on a larger scale. The French press played an
important role in focusing national attention on the questions ART
raised for the notions of the family and the boundaries of nature.42
For example, French news programs featured the test tube baby
Amandine nightly in 1982.43 In 1983, a woman from Nîmes attracted
media attention when she decided to act as a surrogate mother for her
44
twin sister. In August of 1984, the media focused the nation’s
attention on twenty-three-year-old Corinne Paraplaix’s attempt to
sue the CECOS for access to sperm that her husband had deposited
45
before his death from testicular cancer. Corinne Paraplaix hoped to
use this sperm for an in vitro fertilization process so that she might
bear her dead husband’s child.46 In a controversial decision, a French
47
court eventually granted her request.
These highly publicized incidents triggered widespread public
debate about the difficult moral, philosophical, and legal dilemmas
ART engendered.48 Could frozen sperm be treated as property? Was
post-mortem insemination the equivalent of “orphaning” a child at
birth? As the courts struggled with cases like Corinne Paraplaix’s, it
became apparent that no existing legal guidelines could adequately
address these issues.49 The French press and public therefore
demanded an immediate response from the government to these
moral dilemmas.50
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
See Fagot-Largeault, supra note 15, at 10-12.
See id.
See id. at 11.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See JEAN-CLAUDE CHARNET & MARIE-DOMINIQUE CADIEU, ELEMENTS POUR UNE
RÉFLEXION BIOÉTHIQUE EN CLASSE: DE LA PROCRÉATION À LA BIOÉTHIQUE [ELEMENTS FOR
BIOETHICAL REFLECTION IN CLASS: FROM PROCREATION TO BIOETHICS] 55 (1996) (“Par
l’intermédiaire des médias, des réponses étaient instamment demandées . . . .” This translates as:
“By the intermediary of the media, answers [to these bioethics dilemmas] were demanded
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B. The French National Bioethics Committee
To help address these emerging bioethics dilemmas, Président
François Mitterand officially inaugurated a national bioethics
committee, called the CCNE (Comité Consultatif National d’Éthique
51
pour les Sciences de la Vie et de la Santé), on February 23, 1983.
The committee’s explicit purpose is the examination and exploration
of the ethical questions engendered by scientific progress;52 Article 23
of the 1994 bioethics laws extended this role to include the
publication of recommended courses of action for the government
and society.53 Both scientists and non-scientists make up the
membership of the CCNE; the government appoints philosophers,
54
researchers, theologians, and ethicists to the committee. The
committee has no actual legislative power, but the advisory reports
(avis) it publishes about biomedical ethics are highly influential.55 The
56
French legislature relied heavily on the CCNE’s advisory reports
during the 1994 bioethics debates.57
C. Drafting the 1994 French Bioethics Laws
The National Assembly voted bioethics law No. 94-654 into
effect on July 29, 1994.58 The provisions of Article L. 152.1 and 152.2
instantly . . . .”).
51. See Anne Fagot-Largeault, Normativités biologique et sociale, in FONDEMENTS
NATURELS DE L’ÉTHIQUE 191, 212 (Jean-Pierre Changeux ed., Editions Odile Jacob 1991).
Anne Fagot-Largeault, a member of the CCNE, remarked, “To address the ethical problems
engendered by biomedical advances, how have our societies proceeded? By naming committees
and commissions . . . .” Id. (“Pour régler les problèmes d’éthique issus des avancées
biomédicales, comment nos sociétés ont-elles procédé? Elles ont nommé des comités ou
commissions . . . .”).
52. See Szleper, supra note 24, at 117.
53. See Law No. 94-654 of July 29, 1994, J.O., July 30, 1994, p. 11,067; D.S.L. 1994, 29, 411.
54. See Claire Ambroselli, France: A National Committee Debates the Issues, HASTINGS
CTR. REP., Dec. 6, 1984, at 20.
55. See Fagot-Largeault, supra note 15, at 11-12 (describing the response of government
officials and legislators to the 1984 advisory report on ART); see also SUZANNE RAMEIX,
FONDEMENTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DE L’ÉTHIQUE MEDICALE 13, 118-24 (1996) (describing how
doctors in the late twentieth century have increasingly turned to ethics scholars and theologians
for guidance in responding to new medical concerns and noting the recent growth in the number
of ethics committees).
56. See, e.g., Avis No. 3, Opinion on Ethical Problems Arising out of Artificial Reproductive
Techniques (Oct. 23, 1984), http://www.ccne-ethique.org (on file with the Duke Law Journal);
Avis No. 18, Update on Studies Undertaken by the Committee Regarding Gamete and Embryo
Donation (Dec. 15, 1989), http://www.ccne-ethique.org (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
57. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
58. See Law No. 94-654 of July 29, 1994, J.O., July 30, 1994, p. 11,060; D.S.L. 1994, 29, 411.
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of this law are as follows:
Art. L. 152.1- [Artificial Reproductive Technology] includes clinical
and biological practices that permit in vitro fertilization, the transfer
of embryos, artificial insemination and all technology with
equivalent effects that enable procreation outside of the natural
process.
Art. L. 152.2- [Artificial Reproductive Technology] is intended to
respond to the parental demand of a couple.
Its object is to remedy infertility of a pathological character which
has been medically diagnosed. Its object is also to avoid the
transmission of a particularly grave illness to a child.
The man and woman forming the couple must be alive, of
procreative age, married or able to prove that they have lived
together for at least two years and have consented to the transfer of
59
embryos and insemination.

The above articles restrict access to ART to heterosexual couples
of procreative age. Post-mortem and post-menopausal insemination
are effectively banned, as is the use of artificial procreative
technology by homosexual couples or single women. The laws ensure
that ART can only be used in response to medical or clinical needs,
i.e., as a means of circumventing medically diagnosed infertility.60
The bioethics legislation ultimately passed by the National
61
Assembly required two years of debate in the French Parliament.
The laws were based primarily on the research and recommendations
of various reports requested by the government over the period of
almost a decade.62 From the beginning, the government reports
consistently recommended limiting access to ART. In 1986, during
the Mitterand presidency, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac requested
the first of these reports from the Conseil d’État (the Council of State,
a body made up of senior civil servants whose primary role is to
advise the government).63 Guy Braibant (the former head of the
Conseil d’État) prepared the report and addressed issues including

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 11,062.
See id.
See Jean-Yves Nau, Bioethics Laws in France, 344 LANCET 48, 48 (1994).
See id.
See Avis No. 18, supra note 56.
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prenatal diagnostics, ART, and embryo donation. The Braibant
report recommended that ART remain a purely medical technique
and explicitly denounced use of the technology by homosexuals and
post-mortem insemination.64 When it was finally published in 1988,
some legislators criticized the report for being too liberal because it
did not condemn embryo research outright, while scientists objected
65
that it too greatly restricted biomedical research.
Ideas similar to those of Braibant recurred in Noëlle Lenoir’s
June 1991 government report, which she researched and published at
66
the request of then Prime Minister Michel Rocard. Lenoir, another
former member of the Council of State, again stressed that ART
should only be used for medical reasons and not simply to respond to
the “procreative fantasies by one’s self and for one’s self.”67
French parliamentarians later compiled two additional reports.
In February 1992, Franck Sérusclat, a socialist senator (un sénateur),
and Bernard Bioulac, a socialist deputy (un député) in the National
Assembly, submitted reports intended to inform legislators about
68
bioethics questions. The parliamentarians reiterated what was
beginning to become a familiar refrain in the bioethics debates: they
69
advised that access to ART be restricted to heterosexuals.
Following the publication and study of these reports, three
bioethics laws were submitted for consideration by the French
70
Parliament on March 25, 1992. An initial vote on the bioethics laws
took place in the National Assembly on November 26, 1992.71 A very

See Conseil d’Jtat, Sciences de la vie: de l’éthique au droit, in HISTOIRE DE LA
66, 69 (1990). This report, compiled by
Guy Braibant, is commonly referred to as the rapport Braibant but is officially entitled Sciences
de la vie: de l’éthique au droit (Biological Sciences: From Ethics to Law).
65. See ARNOUX, supra note 10, at 318.
66. See id. Lenoir’s report is entitled Aux frontières de la vie: une éthique biomédicale à la
française (At the Frontiers of Life: Biomedical Ethics the French Way).
67. LENOIR, supra note 20, at 45.
68. See ARNOUX, supra note 10, at 319.
69. See Bernard Bioulac, Rapport d’information No. 2565, Assemblée Nationale (Feb. 2,
1992); SÉRUSCLAT, supra note 1, at 36.
70. The French Parliament is made up of two houses: the National Assembly and the
Senate. The National Assembly is the more powerful and dominant chamber of Parliament. It
may veto bills passed by the Senate. If the Senate vetoes bills passed by the National Assembly,
however, a conciliation committee made up of members of both chambers meets to work out a
compromise. See IAN DERBYSHIRE, POLITICS IN FRANCE: FROM GISCARD TO MITTERAND 1012 (1987).
71. See ARNOUX, supra note 10, at 319.
64.

RECHERCHE BIOMÉDICALE ET DROITS DE L’HOMME
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large majority adopted the legislative proposal addressing ART in the
National Assembly: 346 deputies voted for the law; 78 voted against.72
The 1993 elections delayed a reading of the bioethics laws by
73
both the National Assembly and the Senate until 1994. During the
interim, Mitterand affirmed that the bioethics laws remained a
74
priority for his administration. In June 1993, Mitterand’s new prime
minister, Edouard Balladur, asked Professor Jean-François Mattei, a
pediatrician and geneticist at the Université de Marseilles, to examine
the bioethics laws that had been submitted to the National Assembly
in 1992.75 Mattei, a UDF (Union pour la Démocratie Française)
deputy from Bouches-du-Rhônes, consequently published a third
parliamentary report on November 16, 1993, written in the same vein
as those published by Bioulac and Sérusclat.76 Mattei’s report and his
expert testimony in the National Assembly so profoundly influenced
parliamentary debate that some have dubbed him the “father” of the
French 1994 bioethics laws.77
The proposed laws went back and forth between the Senate and
78
the National Assembly. On January 19-20, 1994, the Senate voted on
the texts adapted by the National Assembly in 1992.79 The Senate
reaffirmed, as recommended by the various government reports, that
80
ART could only be used by infertile heterosexual couples. The
Senate also specified that couples must prove they have been together
81
for at least two years in order to have access to ART. For the most
part, though, the Senate made few significant changes in the

72. See id. The Socialist Party endorsed the bioethics law. See id. Interestingly, members of
both the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF), a center-right party that is opposed to
state intervention, and the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), a neo-Gaullist party that
supports state intervention, both voted for the project. See id.
73. See CHARNET & CADIEU, supra note 50, at 84.
74. See Szleper, supra note 24, at 39.
75. See CHARNET & CADIEU, supra note 50, at 83.
76. See ARNOUX, supra note 10, at 39.
77. See Catherine Vincent, La brevetabilité du vivant en quête d’éthique; Un rapport
parlementaire souligne les lacunes d’une directive européene sur la protection juridique des
inventions biotechnologiques [The Ethics of the Patentability of Life: A Parliamentary Report
Highlights the Shortcomings of a European Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotech
Inventions], LE MONDE, July 4, 1996, at 23.
78. See ARNOUX, supra note 10, at 39.
79. See CHARNET & CADIEU, supra note 50, at 84 n.222.
80. See id. at 84.
81. See id.
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legislation.82 Again, a large degree of consensus surrounded the issue
of ART and family.
The laws were then transmitted to the National Assembly in
83
April 1994 for a vote on the amendments made by the Senate. The
National Assembly adopted the bills and sent them once again to the
84
Senate in May of 1994. During this session, the senators returned to
the issue of access to ART, and they again emphasized the
importance of restricting it to heterosexual couples of procreative
85
age. The National Assembly and the Senate disagreed on several
other points, though, such as the senators’ efforts to ban embryo
experimentation completely. Thus, in accordance with standard
parliamentary procedure, a special committee made up of members
from both chambers of the legislature met to draft a compromise for
the laws. The senators ultimately agreed to allow embryo
experimentation, but only within strict limits.86 The legislators’
disagreement during the bioethics debates, therefore, was mainly
confined to issues besides access to ART.
A few staunch opponents of the ART laws emerged in both the
Senate and the National Assembly. One of the most vocal opponents
87
of the bioethics laws in the Senate was Bernard Seillier. Seillier
opposed the laws because he believed that no one at all should be
allowed to use artificial procreative technology.88 Seillier proclaimed
in an article published after the debates, “I was the only one to ask
the fundamental ethical question, is it legitimate to use artificial
methods in place of the natural process?”89
Seillier’s counterpart in the National Assembly was Christine
Boutin, a UDF deputy from Yvelines. Boutin opposed the articles
drafted concerning ART because she also believed that they were not
conservative enough in their restriction of the use of the technology.
Boutin objected to the fact that ART was becoming a commonplace

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id.
See Szleper, supra note 24, at 39.
See CHARNET & CADIEU, supra note 50, at 92.
See id.
See DERBYSHIRE, supra note 70, at 12.
See Bernard Seillier, Ethique ou anti-éthique [Ethics or Anti-ethics], 5 LES PETITES
AFFICHES, Dec. 14, 1994, at 149.
88. See id.
89. Id. (“[J]e fus bien seul pour soulever la question éthique préliminaire, à savoir la
légitimité même de recourir à des méthodes artificielles à la place du processus naturel . . . .”).
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“quasi natural mode of procreation.”90 She stated, “[ART] is not a
panacea and should only be used exceptionally! . . . [ART] in its
diverse applications, has taken on such an importance that it goes
91
beyond its primary object: it is now the crucible of all dangers.”
Boutin wanted to further restrict access to ART because she viewed
the technology as dehumanizing: “I will say that the more one leaves
behind the natural process of procreation, the more one enters the
artificial, and the more one dehumanizes.”92
Despite Seillier and Boutin’s vocal—but largely unsupported—
opposition, the Parliament officially adopted the bioethics laws on
93
June 23, 1994. On June 29, Philippe Séguin, a member of the RPR
(Rassemblement pour la République) and the president of the
National Assembly, transmitted the laws to the Constitutional
Council (Conseil Constitutionnel), a nine-member court that judges
94
the constitutionality of laws. Séguin’s action highlighted the
importance the French government accorded to the bioethics laws.
The president of the National Assembly rarely submits a law to the
Constitutional Council, and, moreover, this option is usually only
used for questions of parliamentary procedure.95 In submitting the law
to the Council, Séguin hoped to endow the laws with the power of a
96
constitutional decree. In a letter to the president of the Council he
wrote:
In consideration of the importance of these [bioethics laws] for
determining the liberties and fundamental rights which proceed
from the principles and rules validated by the constitution, I think
they should be reviewed by the Constitutional Council to ensure
that their conformity to the Constitution will never be questioned
and that their value as rules of arbitration be endowed by the most
97
appropriate court.

90. CHRISTINE BOUTIN, POUR LA DÉFENSE DE LA VIE [FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIFE] 42
(Pierre Téqui ed., 1993) (“un mode quasi naturel de procréation”).
91. Id. (“[ART] n’est pas une panacée et qu’elle ne devrait être qu’une technique
exceptionnelle! . . . [ART], d’une façon générale, a pris une telle ampleur qu’elle a debordé son
objectif originaire: elle est devenue le creuset de tous les dangers . . . .”).
92. Id. (“Je dirais que plus on s’éloigne du processus naturel de la procréation, plus on
entre dans une ère d’artifices, et plus on se déshumanise.”).
93. See BrJhier, supra note 3, at 8.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Id. The above translates to
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The Constitutional Council’s decision to ratify the bioethics laws
appeared in the Journal Officiel de la République, an official
publication of the French government that documents recent
98
legislation. Noëlle Lenoir, who had become a member of
Constitutional Council, asserted that the French court was the only
one in the world to have reviewed such general bioethics laws.99
Lauding the court’s action as “creative,” Lenoir praised the
Constitutional Council for referring to the 1789 Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen to judge the constitutionality of the laws
and stated that the laws were an important “protection against
dangerous scientific practices.”100
As of 1991, however, ART still accounts for less than 1% of
101
births in France. Why has so much attention been focused on a
technology that continues to affect only a small fraction of the entire
French population? The transcripts of the French legislative debates
suggest that ART has attracted so much controversy because of its
potential effect on the traditional family structure. In her report to
the French government, Noëlle Lenoir affirmed that “the quantitative
aspect is minor. What counts above all is the fact that medically
assisted procreation disrupts our traditional understanding of modes
of conception and parental structures.”102
It has long been assumed that the only “natural” family is the
traditional one headed by a heterosexual couple of procreative age.
However, the new technologies make it possible for lesbian couples
and post-menopausal women to bear genetically related children. The
reality of these possibilities exposes seemingly fundamental
assumptions about the “natural” family as just that: assumptions, not
absolutes imposed by nature. Professor Martha Minow explains that
the practices of artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization

Eu égard à la portée déterminante de ces textes pour la mise en œuvre de libertés et
de droits fondamentaux qui procèdent de principes et de règles à valeur
constitutionnelle, j’éstime devoir les soumettre au Conseil constitutionnel afin que
leur conformité à la Constitution ne puisse être affectée d’aucune incertitude et que
puisse être consacrée par les voies les plus appropriées la valeur de réference des
règles principales qu’ils édictent.
98. See Lenoir, supra note 4, at 1261.
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. See LENOIR, supra note 20, at 31.
102. Id. (“L’aspect quantitatif est mineur. Ce qui compte surtout, c’est le fait que les
procréations médicalement assistées boulversent nos reprèsentations traditionnelles des modes
de conception et des structures de la parenté.”).
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“expose social and cultural choices involved in what the law had
previously treated as natural.”103 As I will explore further in Parts II
and III, this repeated discussion of the relationship between family,
nature, and society marks the re-emergence of central Enlightenment
themes in the contemporary biomedical ethics debates in France.
II. FAMILY, SOCIETY, AND ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
The patriarchal family prevalent during the eighteenth century
hardly resembles the widely diverse family units of the twentieth and
104
twenty-first centuries. In fact, the growing number of families made
up of unmarried couples or single parents has led French sociologists
to ask whether we are even capable of defining the contemporary
family.105 Nonetheless, these two different time periods share a
fundamental view of the role of the family: in both times, the wellbeing and the stability of the family unit are perceived to be
inextricably linked to the well-being and stability of society as a
whole.
This part will explore how the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau
about the importance of proper reproduction and child-rearing
methods helped to establish French society’s focus on the close
interrelationship between the well-being of the family and society
106
during the Enlightenment. Analysis of the family-centered rhetoric
the legislators used during the bioethics debates suggests that
Rousseau’s ideas continue to circulate in a transmuted form in
France. But whereas Rousseau depicted the family as a privileged
unit of social reform and change, the legislators attempted to use the
family as a bulwark against the disintegration of traditional social
norms.
A. Politicizing the Family in the Eighteenth Century
Historical records indicate that prior to the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, the birth of children was viewed primarily as a
103. Martha Minow, Lecture at Harvard University (May 1997) (transcript on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
104. See Louis Roussel, peut-on donner une définition de la famille?, in LA FAMILLE ET LES
FAMILLES: QUELLES IDENTITES AUJOURD’HUI? 13, 16-17 (Robert Steichen & Guy de Villers
eds., Academia Bruylant 1990) (outlining the historical changes in family structure).
105. See id.
106. See id.
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means of legitimating a marriage.107 But beginning in the seventeenth
century, historians of the family observed a dramatic change in this
attitude: “The family ceased to be solely an institution of private
rights for the transmission of objects and family name, it assumed a
moral and spiritual function, it formed bodies and souls.”108 Around
this time, aristocratic and bourgeois families seemed to rediscover the
child and began to accord him an increasingly bigger role, until finally
the family centered around the child.109 As children became more of a
part of the every day life of French families, the family came to be
110
viewed as a sort of “small society.”
In the eighteenth century, close relationships between parents
and their children came to be highly valued. As French historian of
the family André Burguière explains:
In the eighteenth century, both the relaxation of religious control
and the contagious effect of an ideology, daughter of the
“Enlightenment,” favorable to the autonomy of the individual and
the pursuit of pleasure and worldly happiness expressed in an
outpouring of sentiment gave rise to a permissive climate for
111
sexuality and proposed marriage for love as a social ideal.

The child became the focus of this new Enlightenment cult of
112
sentiment, the key person in the familial network. Enlightenment
thinkers valued knowledge and reason and viewed the child as the

107.

See André Burguière & François Lebrun, Le prêtre, le prince et la famille, in HISTOIRE
93, 96 (André Burguière et al. eds., 1986).
108. PHILLIPE ARIÈS, L’ENFANT ET LA FAMILLE SOUS L’ANCIEN RÉGIME [THE CHILD AND
FAMILY LIFE DURING THE ANCIEN RÉGIME] 464 (1960).
109. See Paul Servais, Les Familles Européennes et l’histoire: à la recherche des invariances à
la découverte des contingences, in LA FAMILLE ET LES FAMILLES: QUELLE IDENTITÉ
AUJOURD’HUI?, supra note 104, at 39 (“La famille aristocratique et bourgeoise, entre le XVIe et
le XXe siècle, redécouvre l’enfant, lui accorde une place de plus en plus grande et finit par se
centrer sur lui.” This translates as: “Between the sixteenth and the twentieth century,
aristocratic and middle-class families rediscovered the child, gave him a larger and larger role,
and finally centered themselves around him.”).
110. ARIÈS, supra note 108, at 457.
111. Burguière & Lebrun, supra note 107, at 113 (“Au XVIIIè siècle, le relâchement du
contrôle religieux et l’effet de contagion d’une idéologie, fille des <<Lumières>>, favorable à
l’autonomie de l’individu, à la construction d’un bonheur terrestre fondé sur l’effusion
sentimentale et le plaisir, fait resurgir un climat permissif à l’égard de la sexualité et propose le
mariage d’amour comme idéal social.”).
112. See Michel Vovelle, Preface to L’ENFANT, LA FAMILLE, ET LA RÉVOLUTION
FRANÇAISE 18 (Marie Françoise Levy & Olivier Orban eds., 1990) (“[P]olitique volontaire . . .
désigne l’enfant dans une place nouvelle—comme le personnage essentiel du réseau familial.”).
DE LA FAMILLE [HISTORY OF THE FAMILY]
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future beneficiary of this knowledge.113 These developments led
historian Philippe Ariès to comment that during the Enlightenment,
“it was not individualism that triumphed, it was the family.”114
The reorganization of the French family around intimacy and
child-rearing was accelerated by the rise of a print culture in the
115
1750s. New systems of printing and distribution enabled the
widespread publication of domestically oriented manuals and
novels.116 The individuals promoting the new “familialism” included
117
jurists, physicians, philosophers, and novelists. The new family
household arrangements suggested by these writings “constituted an
attempt to reorganize and regulate a plurality of practices thriving in
various regions, social castes, and classes in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.”118 For example, sovereigns set legislative
obstacles to divorce and attempted to use the family “as an essential
119
link in the ever more necessary surveillance of individuals.”
Rousseau was a particularly important promoter of the new
focus on the importance of the family to the well-being of society
120
during the Enlightenment. Michel Verelle comments, “Was there
not, on the eve of the Revolution, a kind of agreement around a new
vision of the family, around a new sensibility to the family, of which a
diffuse but widespread Rousseauism would have been the
expression?”121 For example, Rousseau’s Émile (1762) focused
113. See Servais, supra note 109, at 39 (“La responsabilité éducative de la famille, déjà
présente dans l’Antiquité, a été retrouvée, mais . . . [cette] fois, c’est dans l’intérêt de
l’enfant . . . .”).
114. ARIÈS, supra note 108, at 461 (“Ce n’est pas l’individualisme qui a gagné, c’est la
famille.”).
115. See RODDEY REID, FAMILIES IN JEOPARDY: REGULATING THE SOCIAL BODY IN
FRANCE, 1750-1910, at 28 (1993).
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 29.
119. Burguière & Lebrun, supra note 107, at 110 (“comme un relais essentiel dans la
surveillance de plus en plus nécessaire des individus”).
120. Mira Morgenstern states that Rousseau’s
[c]ontemporary liberal political thought of the 17th and 18th centuries, on the other
hand, tended to see the private sphere as completely separate from the public realm;
hence irrelevant to it and therefore unimportant. Rousseau is likewise unsympathetic
to this view, demonstrating the interconnectedness between the private and public
realms and consequently the immense political significance of the quotidian.
Mira Morgenstern, Rousseau for the Twentieth Century: Interpretations of the Family, in
READING LA NOUVELLE HÉLOÏSE TODAY 223, 231 n.18 (Ourida Mostefai ed., 1993).
121. Vovelle, supra note 112, at 16 (“N’y avait-il pas, à la veille de la Révolution, une sorte
de rencontre autour d’une image nouvelle de la famille, autour d’une sensibilité nouvelle à la
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entirely on the education of children and their introduction to
society.122 Rousseau questioned the validity of various traditions in
child care in Émile.123 He decried the practice of swaddling, and he
even went so far as to suggest that religious instruction be withheld
from children until adolescence.124 Rousseau also strongly supported
breast-feeding because he thought the practice would help develop
125
the affective relations between mother and child. In fact, Émile was
directly responsible for the breast-feeding fashion that took hold of
upper-class households during the Restoration.126
Rousseau capitalized on the political potential of familial
discourse in his novels because he hoped social values could be
reformed by means of the reorganization of the family. In Émile,
Rousseau outlined the project of reform he envisioned for the
household:
If women would only deign to nurse their children, morals would
reform of themselves, sentiments of nature would awaken in every
heart, the State would become populated again; this first point, this
point alone [subsumes] all the others. The attraction of domestic life
is the best antidote to bad morals. Thus, the mere correction of these
excesses would result in a general reformation; soon nature would
reassert its rights. Once women become mothers again, men will
127
soon become again fathers and husbands.

Rousseau again explored the link between the moral well-being
of society and the well-being of the family in the immensely successful
128
epistolary novel Julie ou La Nouvelle Héloïse (1761). As noted
famille dont un rousseauisme diffus mais diffusé aussi aurait été l’expression?”).
122. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILIE OU DE L’IDUCATION passim (J.M. Gallanar
ed., 1762).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Burguière & Lebrun, supra note 107, at 143; see also REID, supra note 115, at 42.
Reid states that this breast-feeding fashion actually had profound political implications and has
been described as a “conscious” and “well-timed” political act:
“The aristocracy appropriated domesticity as a class ideal in an effort to answer
middle-class criticism of the nobility and, consequently, to forestall the political
triumph of the bourgeoisie during the Restoration. Domesticity . . . was fundamental
to the aristocracy’s program for class preservation and political survival.”
Id. (quoting Margaret H. Darrow, French Noblewomen & the New Domesticity, 1750-1850, 5
FEMINIST STUD. 41, 42 (1971)).
127. REID, supra note 115, at 26-27 (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ÉMILE OU DE
L’ÉDUCATION 258 (Gallimand 1969)).
128. Between 1778 and 1978, fifty-five different editions of La Nouvelle Héloïse were
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historian of the Enlightenment Ernst Cassirer remarked, “All the
second half of the Nouvelle Héloïse is dedicated to this vindication of
the family, which is considered to be the guardian and the protector
of all human virtues.”129 Rousseau explicitly established a link
between the public and domestic spheres at the very outset of La
Nouvelle Héloïse when he wrote in the second preface, “If there is to
be a reform in public morals, it must start in the domestic morals; and
this will ultimately depend on fathers and mothers.”130
But why this focus on the family? And what exactly would
Rousseau like to see transformed in society? The article Famille in
the Enlightenment Encyclopédie suggests an answer to the first
131
query. This article defines the family “as a ‘domestic society’
established by nature.”132 Harvard Professor of Romance Languages
and Literature Christie McDonald explains that during the
Enlightenment the family was thought to serve “as the foundation of
national society because a people or nation ‘is simply a composite of
several families.’”133 Rousseau expressed this view in Du Contrat
social:
The most ancient of all societies, and the only natural one, is that of
the family. . . . The family is therefore, if you wish, the first model of
political societies. The leader is the image of the father, the people
are the image of the children; and since all are born equal and free,
134
they only alienate their freedom for their own utility.

published. This figure does not include works published in œuvres complètes and unofficial
editions of the book. See Raymond Trousson, La Nouvelle Héloïse devant la critique et l’histoire
littéraires au XIXe siecle, in READING LA NOUVELLE HÉLOÏSE TODAY, supra note 120, at 12.
129. ERNST CASSIRER, LE PROBLÈME JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU 84 (1987) (“Toute la
deuxième partie de La Nouvelle Héloïse est consacrée à cette apologie de la famille, considérée
comme la gardienne et la protectrice de toutes les vertus humaines.”).
130. ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 751 (“S’il y a quelque reforme à tenter dans les mœurs
publiques, c’est par les moeurs domestiques qu’elle doit commencer; et cela dépend
absoluments des pères et mères.”).
131. See Christie McDonald, The Changing Discourse on the Family and State: The Case of
Bastardy, in STUDIES ON VOLTAIRE AND THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1684 (Murray G.H.
Pittock ed., 1992).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1684-85.
134. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 132, in 4 THE COLLECTED
WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU (Roger D. Masters & Christopher Kelly eds., Roger D. Masters et al.
trans., University Press of New England 1994) [hereinafter ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT].
The original French reads:
La plus ancienne de toutes les sociétés et la seule naturelle est celle de la famille . . . .
La famille est donc si l’on veut le premier modèle des sociétés politiques; le chef est
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For Rousseau, the family is the prototype of the state. While
Rousseau did not consider the family to be the exact equivalent of the
136
state, he did believe that, as the basic unit of society, the family
could act as a model for political society. Rousseau seemed to believe
that the family unit, as the original (and the only “natural”) society,
could help guide widespread social reform. Rousseau hoped to signal
political change through familial discourse, and therefore he
promoted reform of the family in novels like Émile and La Nouvelle
Héloïse, in order to create a model for political change on a larger
scale. He incorporated the family into political discourse as a means
of encouraging reform of the public sphere.
But to what end did Rousseau inscribe political rhetoric in
discourse about the family? Literary historian Roddey Reid answers
that eighteenth-century literature such as Rousseau’s “helped
produce and circulate in turn a new discourse of ‘family’ that worked
to dismantle the absolutist sphere of political representations and to
inscribe a new sense of national community structured by the norms
137
and sensibility of domesticity.” To this end, Rousseau created
several different family models in La Nouvelle Héloïse whose
structure and function (or rather malfunction) were intended to
critique the legitimacy of the absolutist Ancien Régime government.
For instance, in La Nouvelle Héloïse, Rousseau described the life
of the autocratic d’Itange family in very critical terms. The head of
the d’Itange family, the Baron d’Itange, behaves like a stereotypical
Ancien Régime aristocrat who makes decisions “according to his
138
notion of what is due to his class and social status.” When the
Baron’s daughter, Julie, falls in love with her tutor, Saint-Preux, the
Baron forbids her to marry him because he is not her social equal.
Rousseau, through the character of Lord Edouard Bomston, seems to
lament both the cruelty of the Baron’s behavior and the dictates of
Ancien Régime politics when he writes:

l’image du père, le peuple est l’image des enfans, et tous étant nés égaux et libres
n’aliènent leur liberté que pour leur utilité.
ROUSSEAU, DU CONTRAT SOCIAL OU PRINCIPES DU DROIT POLITIQUE 175-76 (Constant
Bouquin ed., Les Editions du Cheval AilJ 1947) [hereinafter ROUSSEAU, DU CONTRAT
SOCIAL].
135. See Melissa A. Butler, Family and the State in the Works of J.J. Rousseau, in STUDIES
ON VOLTAIRE AND THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, supra note 131, at 1681-82.
136. See McDonald, supra note 131, at 1684.
137. REID, supra note 115, at 103.
138. Morgenstern, supra note 120, at 227.
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Let men rank according to their merit; and let those hearts be united
that are objects of each other’s choice. This is what the good order
of society requires; those who would confine it to birth or riches, are
the real disturbers of that order; and ought to be rendered odious to
139
the public, or punished as enemies to society.

Rousseau was strongly critical of any form of government—
government of the family or of society—that based decisions only
upon social rank and required the complete suppression of individual
140
desires.
Rousseau again united family and politics in his description of the
Wolmar family’s life at Clarens. Rousseau’s depiction of life at Clarens
can be interpreted as an implicit attack on despotism because, like a
despot, Wolmar (the man Julie’s father forces her to marry instead of
Saint-Preux) controls and observes everything. Julie writes to her friend
and cousin Claire that, “M. Wolmar’s chief delight is observation . . . I
have imagined sometimes that he took particular notice of me during
141
these conversations . . . .” Moreover, Saint-Preux’s letters suggest that
life at Clarens is extremely ordered and controlled because the workers
142
at Clarens “have observers that animate and watch them.”
This account of family life at Clarens closely resembles the despotic
states Rousseau denounced in Du Contrat social:
It will be said that the despot guarantees civil tranquillity to his
subjects. . . . What have they gained, if this tranquillity is one of their
miseries? Life is tranquil in jail cells, too. Is that reason enough to
like them? The Greeks lived tranquilly shut up in the Cyclop’s [sic]
143
cave as they awaited their turn to be devoured.

139. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 1 ELOISA 325 (Kenrick trans., 1990) [hereinafter
ROUSSEAU, ELOISA]; ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 170 (“Que le rang se règle par le mérite, et
l’union des cœurs par leur choix, voilà le véritable ordre social; ceux qui le règlent par la
naissance ou par les richesses sont les vrais perturbateurs de cet ordre; ce sont ceux-la qu’il faut
décrier ou punir.”).
140. See ROUSSEAU, 1 ELOISA, supra note 139, at 325; ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 170.
141. ROUSSEAU, 1 ELOISA, supra note 139, at 290; ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 349-50 (“Le
plus grand goût de M.Wolmar est d’observer . . . . J’ai cru remarquer quelquefois qu’il
m’observait durant ces entretiens . . . .”).
142. ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 425 (“ont des surveillants qui les animent et les
observent”).
143. ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 134, at 134. Rousseau wrote:
On dira que le despote assure à ses sujets la tranquillité civile . . . . Qu’y gagnent-ils, si
cette tranquillité même est une de leurs misères? On vit tranquille aussi dans les
cachots; en est-ce assez pour s’y trouver bien? Les Grecs enfermés dans l’antre du
Cyclope y vivaient tranquilles, en attendant que leur tour vint d’être dévorés.
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Similarly, Wolmar’s obsession with order precludes the freedom
and happiness of those under his care. Julie states, “[E]verything
around me gives me cause of content, and yet I am not contented. A
secret languor steals into the bottom of my heart: I find it puffed up
144
and void . . . .” Julie desired order and found it in the confines of
Wolmar’s despotic arms, but she comes to understand that order is
not an absolute sign of legitimacy. It is only when Julie is on her
deathbed after contracting a serious illness that she finally finds
happiness and peace. Julie’s discontentment at Clarens can be
interpreted as an implicit critique of any family—or society—that
attempts to justify itself with the promise of order. One is not fully
human in a despotic family or society because one is forced to live in
chains.
Rousseau’s writings helped to powerfully reshape how the
French conceived of the relationship between family and society:
In his approach to the political significance of daily life Rousseau
distinguishes himself from both his classical and liberal precursors.
Unlike Plato, who viewed the structures of daily life as inherently
antithetical to the higher consciousness required for the attainment
of the just political State, Rousseau demonstrates the positive
contributions of everyday structures like the family to political life.
Contemporary liberal political thought of the 17th and 18th
centuries, on the other hand, tended to see the private sphere as
completely separate from the public realm; hence irrelevant to it and
therefore unimportant. Rousseau is likewise unsympathetic to this
view, demonstrating the interconnectedness between the private and
public realms and consequently the immense political significance of
145
the quotidian.

Thus, by inscribing a critique of Ancien Régime forms of
government in the family-centered discourse of the La Nouvelle
Héloïse, Rousseau created a strong link between the familial and the
political. In so doing, Rousseau helped establish a fundamental view
of the family in French society: discourse about the family was to play
an important role in the reform of society.

ROUSSEAU, DU CONTRAT SOCIAL, supra note 134, at 182.
144. ROUSSEAU, 1 ELOISA, supra note 139, at 194; ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 622 (“Je ne
vois partout que sujets de contentement, et je ne suis pas contente; une langueur secrète
s’insinue au fond de mon cœur; je le sens vide et gonflé . . . .”).
145. Morgenstern, supra note 120, at 231.
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B. Reformulating Rousseau’s Ideas in the Twentieth Century
A comparison of Rousseau’s rhetoric about the family with that
used by the French legislators in the 1994 French bioethics debates
suggests that Rousseau’s ideas about the interrelationship between
the well-being of the family and society continue to be very
146
influential. The wide availability of ART during the twentieth
century has again propelled Rousseau-esque concerns with the
interrelationship between private and public spheres, between family
and society, to the forefront of the public consciousness. The French
legislators drafted the bioethics laws as a means of preventing
technology from destabilizing and reshaping socio-cultural norms:
Recent advances in reproductive technologies have put into
question the belief (whether implicit or explicit) that biology, as a
teleological process, can hold cultural chaos in abeyance. The doors
have been opened wide as the definition and status of mother,
father, and child have all been deeply questioned. . . . There is a
sense that the threat to the family signals a disintegration of order,
leaving the contemporary sense of self bereft of a discourse that can
147
represent universal order.

Confronted with technologies that might further accelerate the
disintegration of bi-parental heterosexual family unit, the legislators
drafted the bioethics laws as a means of re-establishing a sense of
“order” in the face of “cultural chaos.” Close analysis of the
transcripts of the legislative debates reveals that the legislators
restricted access to ART as a means of protecting French society
from the disruptive effects and “disintegration of order” they
believed would accompany dramatic changes in the family structure.148
As discussed in Part I, the French bioethics laws restricted access
to ART to heterosexual couples of procreative age. The legislators
appeared troubled by the possibility that ART could be used to
enable homosexuals, post-menopausal women, and virgins to create
149
children. In part, the legislators restricted access to ART because
146. See id. at 235 (noting that “two hundred years after Rousseau first remarked on the
importance of the family to the resolution of crucial political issues, the family still remains at
the center of political debate”).
147. Christie McDonald, Modern Tales of Anxiety, 43 DIOGENES 69, 69 (1995).
148. See Declan Butler, Bioethics Panels May Be Threat to Public Debate on Research,
NATURE, Jan. 25, 1996, at 289 (stating that, as Phillipe Lazar explains, “the demand for
bioethics legislation . . . is symptomatic of society’s fear of change”).
149. See LENOIR, supra note 20, at 43 (citing the artificial insemination of virgins at a clinic
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they did not want the children to be received into an unstable
environment that might be detrimental for their future psychological
well-being. Charnet and Cadieu, two contemporary analysts of the
French bioethics debates, explain that:
For the members of the parliament, the setting of boundaries on
medical practice was part of an even more fundamental obligation to
ensure respect for values that provide the basis for our society; that
is to say the family, “founding cell in which the child learns about
social dimension, exchange, dialogue, generosity and availability for
150
others.”

In addition to the well-being of the children themselves, another
powerful impetus for these restrictions was the legislators’ apparent
concern that the sudden influx of new reproductive capabilities would
151
destabilize the entire French social system. It was believed this
destabilization would occur because France’s system of laws is
predicated upon the predominance of the more traditional biparental, heterosexual family unit.152 For example, current legal means
of adjudicating paternity could be disrupted because the woman who
provides the ova for an ART procedure might not be the same one in
whom gestation occurs.153 There were additional concerns about
adjudicating paternity because the sperm used for an ART procedure
can be that of the husband, a partner (concubin), an anonymous
donor, or a dead spouse.154 Others expressed alarm at the fact that in
vitro fertilization might be used to disrupt the normal genealogical
development of a family because ova can remain frozen for long
155
periods of time before being implanted in the uterus.
President Mitterand summarized the concerns of the French
government about ART at the first meeting of the CCNE (France’s

in Birmingham as a “good example of what could happen in France” without controls) (“La
révélation de la pratique de l’insémination de femmes vierges par un centre privé de
Birmingham en Angleterre, est un bon exemple de ce qui pourrait arriver en France.”).
150. CHARNET & CADIEU, supra note 50, at 87. The original text reads: “Pour les
parlementaires, cet encadrement de la pratique médicale participe d’une autre exigence plus
fondamentale encore: veiller au respect des valeurs qui fondent notre société, en l’occurence, la
famille, <<cellule fondatrice dans laquelle le petit homme apprend sa dimension sociale,
l’échange, le dialogue, la générosité, la présence aux autres.>>”
151. See ARNOUX, supra note 10, at 475.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See BAUDOUIN & LABRUSSE-RIOU, supra note 12, at 217.
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national bioethics committee) when he stated: “Who is the father?
Who is the mother? The right [to parenthood] is no longer clear-cut,
with in vitro fertilization now possible.”156 Mitterand went on to say
that ART
“disturbs one of the constitutive relations of our identity which
underlies the family and society. . . . Some terrible questions
[arise] . . . . Your committee of ethics must be the place for dialogue,
confrontation, reflection, and advice. It could be a place for
mediating between the collective sensibility and the intervention of
157
the public authorities.”

From the very outset, one of the fundamental tasks set for the
national bioethics committee was the resolution of issues related to
the interaction between family, society, and ART.
The idea that the familial permutations made possible by ART
could cause a contingent destabilization of society was manifest in the
transcripts of the 1994 French legislative debates themselves. For
example, Jean-François Mattei, the so-called father of the bioethics
laws, lamented during a session of the National Assembly:
[Because of ART] [o]ne could witness the birth of children
deliberately conceived without a father, with two fathers and one
mother if the donor was not anonymous, with two mothers but no
father in the case of a lesbian couple. So, in brief, with in vitro
fertilization we could have children with five parents. Is this the
family model that we wish to see developed in our society?
158
Evidently, no!

As suggested by Charnet and Cadieu, Mattei seemed to fear that
French society would be changed for the worse should the
159
government permit use of ART to restructure family norms.

156. Ambroselli, supra note 54, at 20 (quoting President Mitterand’s statement at the first
working meeting of the CCNE in December of 1983).
157. Id.
158. 11 LA BIOÉTHIQUE DEVANT LE PARLEMENT FRANÇAIS: 1988-1994, at 2753 (Tristan
Mage ed., 1994) [hereinafter Debates]. Translated, this reads:
On pourrait alors . . . assister à la naissance d’enfants conçus délibérément, orphelins
de père, avec deux pères et une mère si le donneur n’était pas anonyme, avec deux
mères mais pas de père dans le cas de couples de femmes. Bref, avec la fécondation in
vitro, nous pourrions avoir des enfants ayant cinq parents différents. Est-ce le modèle
familial que nous souhaitons voir se développer dans notre société? Non, à
l’évidence!
Id.
159.

See CHARNET & CADIEU, supra note 50, at 86-88.
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Mattei’s comments reveal a belief that a multiplication of alternative
modes of family will somehow profoundly disturb French society.
Thus, much like Rousseau, Mattei seems to perceive an intimate link
between family and society.
Deputy Elisabeth Hubert appeared to share this viewpoint in her
remarks in a National Assembly session:
Not to legislate is to accept situations that we condemn because of
our culture, of our sense of values, of our vision of man; it is,
tomorrow and forever, to see newspaper headlines about a woman
demanding artificial insemination, about a woman well past the
physiological age for childbearing demanding [ART] . . . . It is to
answer those problems that these [legislative] texts have been
160
drafted.

Like Mattei, Hubert hoped to promote, by means of legislation, a
certain idea of family that marginalized groups that she viewed as a
threat to French culture. The connection between family and society
Rousseau envisioned, it appears, remains a potent idea in French
culture.
As discussed in Part I, such concerns were perhaps most
fervently expressed by UDF Deputy Christine Boutin and Senator
161
Bernard Seillier. These two legislators wanted to institute bioethics
laws that blocked access to ART altogether because of the dire
consequences they believed use of “unnatural” procreative processes
would have on the moral fabric of French society. For instance,
162
Boutin declared that ART was the “crucible of all dangers,” and
Seillier questioned the ethics of using an artificial procreative process
rather than the “natural” one.163
To help prevent these new reproductive capabilities from
disrupting French society, the French legislature specified exactly
which sorts of couples could legally benefit from ART. As discussed
160. Debates, supra note 158, at 2772. In French, this reads:
Ne pas légiférer, c’est accepter des situations que nous condamnons en raison de
notre culture, de notre sense des valeurs, de notre vision de l’homme; c’est, demains
voir encore et toujours les journaux faire la <<une>> sur une femme demandant une
insémination artificielle, sur une femme ayant depuis longtemps depassé l’âge
physiologique pour procréer reclamant une PMA . . . . C’est notamment pour
répondre à ces problèmes que ces textes ont été élaborés.
Id.
161. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
162. BOUTIN, supra note 90, at 42 (“le creuset de tous les dangers”).
163. See Seillier, supra note 87, at 149 (“I was the only one to ask the fundamental ethical
question, is it legitimate to use artificial methods in place of the natural process?”).
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in Part I, the 1994 bioethics laws provide: “The man and woman
forming the couple must be alive, of procreative age, married or able
to prove that they have lived together for at least two years and have
consented to the transfer of embryos and insemination.”164
This restriction of access to ART promotes the traditional biparental, heterosexual norm and implicitly denounces the
promulgation of other less traditional family models. As Mattei
described the legislation, “We have redefined the familial
165
environment desirable to receive a child.”
Thus, implicit in the legal text and the transcripts of the bioethics
debates is a sense that the legislators wanted to slow down the
possible social changes signaled by unrestricted use of biomedical
technology. Headlines about women who have children without
sexual partners or women who have children at age sixty represented,
in the minds of the French legislators, a move towards a state of social
and “reproductive anarchy.” The French legislators designed a legal
text that attempts to hold “cultural chaos in abeyance” by restricting
access to the new reproductive technologies.
III. THE CONCEPT OF NATURE IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE
1994 FRENCH BIOETHICS DEBATES
In order to legitimize restricting access to ART, the French
legislators also appealed to another important Enlightenment theme:
nature. The French legislators appealed to the concept of nature as an
ultimate ethical arbiter between the possible and the permissible in
the 1994 bioethics debates.166 It was in the name of “nature” and the
“natural” that the French legislature limited ART access to sterile
heterosexual couples of procreative age. Artificial insemination of
homosexual or post-menopausal women was condemned as
“unnatural” because equivalent modes of procreation were not to be
found in “nature”; i.e., in the world pre-existing the advent of ART.167
164. Law No. 94-654 of July 29, 1994, J.O., July 30, 1994, p. 11,062; D.S.L. 1994, 29, 411
(“L’homme et la femme formant le couple doivent être vivants, en âge de procréer, mariés ou
en mesure d’apporter la preuve d’une vie commune d’au moins deux ans et consentants
préalablement au transfert des embryons où à l’insémination.”).
165. Debates, supra note 158, at 2757 (“[N]ous avons redéfini le cadre familial souhaitable
pour accueillir l’enfant.”).
166. See infra Part III.B.
167. Anne Fagot-Largeault, a member of the Comité Consultatif National d’Éthique
(CCNE), France’s national bioethics committee, stated, “But ethics includes an irreducible
element of naturalism because it is the facts that select the objectively good norms.” Fagot-
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The legislators, therefore, hoped to find an objective ethical order in
nature that would guide their bioethics deliberations, and thus they
expressly derived “ought” from “is.”168
This part of the Note will argue that this mode of argumentation
can be understood as a selective and transforming interpretation of
Enlightenment ideas about nature and its link to ethics and the social
order. The legislators used words that echo Enlightenment rhetoric,
but they restricted and changed the meaning of Enlightenment
169
terms. Rousseau, among other Enlightenment thinkers, envisioned
a highly complex and dynamic relationship between nature and
culture that was much reduced in the contemporary bioethics
170
debates.
A rereading of Rousseau’s novels facilitates a better
understanding and critique of the legislators’ reliance on a static
171
concept of the “natural” to restrict access to ART. To control
unwanted effects of technology on social norms, the legislators
defined nature in a limited way that, as Rousseau suggested over two

Largeault, supra note 51, at 218 (“Mais l’éthique inclut un élément irréductible de naturalisme,
parce que ce sont les faits qui selectionnent les normes objectivement bonnes.”).
168. See MICHAEL J. REISS & ROGER STRAUGHAN, IMPROVING NATURE? THE SCIENCE
AND ETHICS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 63 (1996).
169. See, e.g., Jean Starobinski, Preface to ERNST CASSIRER, LE PROBLEME JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU xix (Marc B. de Launay trans., 1987) (discussing the existence of “deformed echoes”
(<<échoes déformés>>) of Enlightenment ideas in contemporary society).
170. For instance, Rousseau used the term “nature” to refer to a multitude of ideas,
including “the physical environment, the living force in the world and in a person, what is
original or inherent or spontaneous, what is manifest and what is potential.” JOHN HOPE
MASON, THE INDISPENSABLE ROUSSEAU 260 n.∗ (1979). Thus, for Rousseau, the passage from
nature to ethics involved a dynamic interplay between the exterior world and man’s inner
nature, his inner being. See id.
171. The view of nature as a relatively static entity has also been challenged in the recent
scholarly literature on environmental law. Jonathan Weiner’s BEAK OF THE FINCH makes a
“bold call for a new metaphor of nature” based on Darwinian theories of natural selection.
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories and Consequences, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 326 (1995) (reviewing JONATHAN WEINER, BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY
OF EVOLUTION IN OUR TIME (1994)). Wiener argues that the development of environmental
law is hindered by the predominant view of nature as a static entity. See id. Wiener advocates a
movement away from viewing nature as a “Kodachrome still-life” and towards viewing it as a
“moving picture show . . . continually changing and complex,” in the words of Daniel Botkin. Id.
at 329. In light of this view of nature, which is actually more in line with the vision of nature
Rousseau articulated in the eighteenth century, Wiener argues that “environmental policy is
and ought to be moving away from categorical rules toward weighing harms and benefits in
policy judgments.” Id. at 355. Similarly, this section will suggest that the French bioethics laws
are categorical rules that reflect a static vision of nature and therefore are incapable of
adequately addressing inherently dynamic bioethics questions.
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hundred years ago, confounds traditional views of the “right” with the
natural.
A. Enlightenment Concepts of Nature: Laying the Intellectual
Groundwork for the Contemporary Bioethics Debates
Defining the Enlightenment concept of nature precisely is
difficult because nature represented many different ideas for different
philosophers. During the Enlightenment, nature was associated with
numerous metaphors, including the images of a benevolent mother,
an ever-faithful servant, and even a treacherous enemy.172 But
whether they conceived of man’s relationship with nature as
antagonistic or collaborative, the Enlightenment philosophers agreed
that the “relation was intimate, inescapable, and exclusive.”173
Eighteenth-century philosophers tried to penetrate the “tangle of
meanings clustering around ‘nature’” in order to establish “reliable
174
standards for ethical and aesthetic judgements.”
As God’s creation, nature was a source of truth for
Enlightenment philosophers. Ernst Cassirer commented, “[T]ruth is
revealed not in God’s word but in his work; it is not based on the
testimony of Scripture or tradition but is visible to us [in nature] at all
175
times.” Enlightenment philosophers attempted to derive standards
of “beauty and conduct” from nature.176 For some, nature represented
a rationality and order that was directly accessible to experience. As
Asher Horowitz explains:
All human and divine authority could, in the mind of the
Enlightenment, be replaced by the ultimate authority of unmediated
experience. Nature itself, in its observable and precisely describable
order and regularity, would henceforth be the ultimate and only
177
source of truth and authority.

Enlightenment philosophers believed that nature provided a set
of a priori norms, an immanent and ultimate standard— “standards
178
that are immanent in the process of living matter itself.” Thus, the
172. See 2 PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION 160 (1969).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 161.
175. ERNST CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 43 (Fritz C.A. Koelin
& James P. Pettegrove trans., Princeton University Press 1951) (1932).
176. 2 GAY, supra note 172, at 160.
177. ASHER HOROWITZ, ROUSSEAU, NATURE, AND HISTORY 37 (1987).
178. Id. at 32.
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use of nature as a criterion to help distinguish between right and
wrong has a long tradition in French thought.
Philosophers as different as Diderot and the Marquis de Sade
referred to nature as the ultimate arbiter when deciding questions of
ethics and conduct. Diderot once exclaimed, “O, Nature, everything
that is good is enclosed within your breast. You are the fertile source
of all truth.”179 Diderot believed that in nature man would be able to
find the answer to such questions as “What must I do?” and “Who am
180
I?” He conceived of nature as “a vast interconnected organic whole
in which the steps from matter to life, from science to ethics, from
observation to admiration are not merely possible but proper and
181
indeed essential.”
Even the infamous Marquis de Sade used a certain idea of nature
to justify his views about society. In La Philosophie dans le boudoir
(1795), Sade cited the work of eighteenth-century naturalist Buffon to
reject love. He wrote, “be quick to fly from love. There is none but
physical good in it, said Buffon, and as a good philosopher he
exercised his reason on an understanding of nature. I repeat it, amuse
182
yourselves; but love not at all . . . .” Sade also justified incest and
sodomy as “natural” pleasures: “[I]f nature forbade the pleasures of
sodomy, the pleasures of incest, the filthy, etc. would she have
allowed us to take pleasure in such things at all? It is impossible for
183
nature to tolerate what truly outrages it.”

179.

Norbert Sclippa, La Nouvelle Héloïse et l’aristocratie, in 284 STUDIES ON VOLTAIRE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 9, 37 (H.T. Mason ed., 1991) (quoting a line of Diderot’s
Entretiens sur le fils naturel, which reads, “O, Nature, tout ce qui est bien est renfermé dans ton
sein! Tu es la source féconde de toutes vérités!”).
180. 2 GAY, supra note 172, at 162.
181. Id.
182. MARQUIS DE SADE, Philosophy in the Bedroom, in THE COMPLETE JUSTINE,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE BEDROOM, AND OTHER WRITINGS 179, 285 (Richard Seaver & Austryn
Wainhouse trans., 1965) [hereinafter SADE, Philosophy]. The original French reads: “mais fuyez
avec soin l’amour. Il n’y a de bon que son physique, disait le naturaliste Buffon, et ce n’était pas
sur cela seul qu’il raisonnait en bon philosophe. Je le répète, amusez-vous; mais n’aimez
point . . . .” MARQUIS DE SADE, LA PHILOSOPHIE DANS LE BOUDOIR 173 (Editions Gallimard
1976) (1795) [hereinafter SADE, LA PHILOSOPHIE].
183. SADE, LA PHILOSOPHIE, supra note 182, at 107 (“[S]i la nature défendait les
jouissances sodomites, les jouissances incestueuses, les pollutions, etc., permettrait-elle que nous
y trouvassions autant de plaisir? Il est impossible qu’elle puisse tolérer ce qui l’outrage
véritablement.”). See also SADE, Philosophy, supra note 182, at 237 (“[H]ad Nature condemned
sodomy’s pleasures, incestuous correspondences, pollutions, and so forth, would she have
allowed us to find so much delight in them? That she may tolerate what outrages her is
unthinkable.”).
AND THE
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Furthermore, Enlightenment philosophers often referred to the
idea of natural law that was secularized during the seventeenth
century. Natural laws were understood in the eighteenth century to
be “eternal immutable principles of morality that stand as critics of
184
positive law.” Natural law was also defined as “the set of principles
that the nature of man placed in human reason, principles that
therefore are part of the very nature of man and that the legislature
should include in law.”185
Enlightenment thinkers believed that the foundation of justice,
the social order, and the common good could be derived from these
186
natural laws. As historian Peter Gay notes, Montesquieu once
stated, “In vain do the civil laws make chains . . . natural law will
always break them.”187 Articles written by Boucher D’Argis, Jaucourt,
and Diderot for the Enlightenment Encyclopédie also reflected this
188
point of view: “In the mirror of the state of nature the present form
of the state and contemporary society are to behold their own
countenances and pass judgement on themselves.”189 Eighteenthcentury thinkers used nature as an unforgiving “mirror” to help them
judge the status quo and to legitimate their ideas.
Enlightenment philosophers, however, did not necessarily
promote a return to the state of nature. For instance, Peter Gay
stated of Rousseau that “[t]he original state of nature . . . [is]
ineligible as an option and unsuitable as an ideal. [Its] single use now
is to hold a mirror up to society, that men may learn to despise and to
190
reform it.” Rousseau hoped to realize “natural” man in the political
191
and social state. For Rousseau, natural man was an individual with
spontaneity of emotion who lived in complete equilibrium with his
surroundings.192 Paradoxically, Rousseau believed that liberty could
184.
185.

2 GAY, supra note 172, at 457.
Angèle Kremer-Marietti, Droit naturel et état de nature chez Rousseau, in JEANJACQUES ROUSSEAU ET LA CRISE CONTEMPORAINE DE LA CONSCIENCE 175, 179 (1980)
(“l’ensemble des principes que la nature même de l’homme a mis dans la raison humaine, qui
appartiennent ainsi à la nature même de l’homme et que le législateur devrait inclure dans le
droit positif”).
186. See id. at 177.
187. 2 GAY, supra note 172, at 457.
188. See id.
189. CASSIRER, supra note 175, at 271.
190. 2 GAY, supra note 172, at 538.
191. See Jean Lacroix, La Conscience selon Rousseau, in JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU ET LA
CRISE CONTEMPORAINE DE LA CONSCIENCE 81, 101 (1980).
192. See Kremer-Marietti, supra note 185, at 181.
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only be realized in a society that established laws restricting
freedom.193 In the state of nature, the weak are subjected to the strong
and so it is only in a society founded on consent to the “volontée
194
générale” that the citizen is truly free. Man is truly free in such a
society because he has escaped “the laws of nature, to obey another
law, a law that man has authored himself.”195 A recurring theme of
Rousseau’s writings is that superficial observation of nature cannot
produce a static set of unimpeachable ethical “rules” that can guide
society. Rousseau’s “thought as a whole can be seen as a fundamental
challenge to any philosophy that would attempt to grasp the problems
of society and politics by way of any abstract and static concept of
nature.”196
Rather, Rousseau believed that one must become immersed in
nature in order to become intimately sensitive to her “rhythms” and,
simultaneously, more in equilibrium with one’s self. Asher Horowitz
explains that
the nature appealed to is not at all of the order of sense experience,
which has been revealed to be, because of its variability and
subjectivity, unreliable; it is of a higher order. Rousseau calls it the
“divine instinct.” It is an instinct that is active, forming, prehensive,
197
and fundamentally unlike passive and receptive sensation.

Rousseau conceived of nature as more of an active, evolving
force and thus rejected the concept of a universal and permanent set
of natural laws that are immediately intuitively accessible to man. He
was critical of philosophers who promoted a static and immutable
198
vision of a “system of nature.”
In fact, Rousseau’s writings do not clarify exactly what he meant
when he used the term nature. Rousseau “play[ed] with the word
nature without precision, [and] . . . [delighted] in her wealth and never
199
agreed to be bound by one definition.” For Rousseau, nature
193. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins and the Foundations of Inequality
Among Men, in THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 101, 134 (Roger D. Masters ed., Roger
D. Masters & Judith R. Masters trans., 1964) (1755).
194. ROUSSEAU, DU CONTRAT SOCIAL, supra note 134, at 192.
195. RAMEIX, supra note 55, at 43 (“[C]ar il échappe aux lois de la nature, pour obéir à une
loi, dont il est lui-même l’auteur.”).
196. HOROWITZ, supra note 177, at 46.
197. Id. at 43.
198. CASSIRER, supra note 129, at 97 (“système de la nature”).
199. MASON, supra note 170, at 260 n.∗ (quoting PIERRE BURGELIN, IV OEUVRES
COMPLÈTES lxxxix (Pléïade 1959)).
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referred to both man’s internal being and the external environment.
According to Lacroix, he used the term nature to refer
simultaneously to the inner nature of man (nature de l’homme) and
the nature of the external world (nature comme monde exterieur).200
Both types of nature are inextricably linked in Rousseau’s thinking.
In Profession de foi, Rousseau wrote, “Look at nature, listen to the
inner voice, has God not said everything to our eyes, to our
conscience, to our judgement?”201 By observing and immersing
ourselves in the nature of the exterior, we come to better hear and
comprehend the nature of the interior, the conscience.
This theme is central to Rousseau’s Rêveries du promeneur
solitaire. In this work, Rousseau discussed the happiness he derived
from communing with nature on long solitary walks. Rousseau stated,
“These hours of solitude and meditation are the only ones in the day
during which I am fully myself and for myself, without diversion,
without obstacle, and during which I can truly claim to be what nature
202
willed.” His exploration of nature was inextricably linked to his
exploration of self; it is only in nature that he felt really in touch with
his own desires. Cassirer put it thus: “Man is no longer ‘face to face’
with nature, nature is no longer just a spectacle that he will enjoy as a
mere thinker or observer; rather man is immersed in the internal life
of nature, and he obeys nature’s own rhythms.”203
The experiences of Julie in Rousseau’s La Nouvelle Héloïse can
also be interpreted as an implicit critique of any attempt to adhere
too strictly to a static conception of nature’s laws. Julie feared going
against her father and accepting the love she felt for Saint-Preux
because she believed such an action would be “unnatural.”204 In her
conception of the natural order, a daughter should not disobey her
father. Thus, when Julie wrote to Saint-Preux to tell him she could
200. See Lacroix, supra note 191, at 96.
201. Id. at 100 (“Voyez le spectacle de la nature, écoutez la voix intérieure; Dieu n’a-t-il pas
tout dit à nos yeux, à notre conscience, à notre jugement?”) (quoting Rousseau)).
202. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE REVERIES OF THE SOLITARY WALKER 12 (Charles
E. Butterworth trans., New York University Press 1979). The French translates to: “Ces heures
de solitude et de méditation sont les seules de la journée où je suis pleinement moi et à moi sans
diversion, sans obstacle, et où je puisse véritablement dire être ce que la nature a voulu.” JEANJACQUES ROUSSEAU, LES RÊVERIES DU PROMENEUR SOLITAIRE 13 (Henri Roddier ed.,
Garnier Frères 1960) (1782).
203. CASSIRER, supra note 129, at 69 (“L’homme n’est plus seulement <<face à>> la nature,
elle n’est plus pour lui un spectacle dont il jouirait, simple contemplateur et observateur, mais il
est plongé dans la vie interne de cette nature, et il obéit à ses propres rythmes.”).
204. See infra notes 205-06.
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not marry him, she told him that a girl who allowed passion to make
her forget her blood ties was a “fille dénaturée.”205 In addition, Julie
refused Lord Bomston’s offer of refuge in England with Saint-Preux
206
in the name of the “laws of consanguinity and the laws of nature.”
Julie sacrificed her love because she believed it to be counter to her
father’s will, and thus against nature. Unwilling to challenge tradition
and marry a man who is not her social equal (her tutor), Julie agreed
to marry Wolmar, the man selected by her father. She believed this to
be the only rational and natural course of action left open to her. At
the altar on her wedding day, she said, “An invisible power seemed
suddenly to rectify the disorder of my affections, and to settle them
according to the laws of duty and nature.”207 Julie suddenly felt at
peace because she believed that by obeying her father she has re208
aligned herself with the laws of nature.
Ultimately, though, Julie rejected the life that her limited
understanding of nature and reason guided her to take. In a letter she
wrote to Saint-Preux on her death bed, she proclaimed:
No, we will not part—I go but to expect you. That virtue, which
separated us on earth, will unite us for ever [sic] in the mansions of
the blessed. I die in that peaceful hope; too happy to purchase at the
expense of my life the privilege of loving you without a crime, and of
209
telling you so once more.

With her final breath, she embraced the passion and love she had
previously denounced in the name of nature. Julie failed to realize
happiness in life because she allowed herself to be guided by an
imagined and static order of nature that conformed to her experience
(i.e., to the dictates of her father and society).
Rousseau rejected such a static view of nature that confounded
tradition and the status quo with the “natural.” Rousseau viewed
nature as a dynamic force and he did not believe that natural law was
205. ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 45.
206. ROUSSEAU, 2 ELOISA, supra note 139, at 2; ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 184 (“droits du
sang et de la nature”).
207. ROUSSEAU, 2 ELOISA, supra note 139, at 259; ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 333 (“Une
puissance inconnue sembla corriger tout à coup le désordre de mes affections et les rétablir
selon la loi du devoir et de la nature.”).
208. See Sclippa, supra note 179, at 39.
209. ROUSSEAU, 4 ELOISA, supra note 139, at 281; ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 731 (“Non,
je ne te quitte pas, je vais t’attendre. La vertu qui nous sépara sur la terre nous unira dans le
séjour éternel. Je meurs dans cette douce attente : trop heureuse d’acheter au prix de ma vie le
droit de t’aimer toujours sans crime, et de te le dire encore une fois!”).
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immediately accessible to unaided rational intuition.210 In the
Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality (1755)
Rousseau stated that philosophers caught in this trap “have all felt
the necessity of going back to the state of nature, but none of them
has reached it.”211 According to Rousseau, the philosophers of natural
law who hold too strictly to the dictates of nature are
in the habit of abstracting the content of natural law from the
behaviour of men in civil society, attributing the rationality they
imagine they see there to an atemporal cognitive faculty and
reconstructing the relations among men in such a way that nature
turns out to correspond to those types of relations they would prefer
to see in existence. The nature that they oppose to various forms of
212
artifice thus turns out to be equally artificial and arbitrary . . . .

Rousseau realized that the “natural laws” referred to as
incontrovertible by some philosophers are, in fact, subjective laws
that they have developed from observations of their own society. As
Kremer-Marietti remarked, “Rousseau’s originality consists in his
shrewd suspicion that the meaning of a concept depends on the
cultural context and has nothing to do with nature.”213 Rousseau
specifically criticized Thomas Hobbes on these grounds in the
214
Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality. Rousseau
asserted that the war-like state of nature described by Hobbes is in
fact an image falsely derived from his observation of the then-present
state of society;215 Rousseau himself believed that the state of nature,

210. In Émile, Rousseau writes that the laws of nature are “mysteries . . . beyond the region
of sense; we think we can penetrate them by the light of reason, but we fall on our imagination.”
HOROWITZ, supra note 177, at 48 (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ÉMILE 260 (Barbara
Foxley trans., Dutton 1976) (1762)).
211. Rousseau, supra note 193, at 102.
212. HOROWITZ, supra note 177, at 48 (emphasis added).
213. Kremer-Marietti, supra note 185, at 184 (“L’originalité de Rousseau consiste en
l’habileté de savoir s’y prendre pour soupçonner qu’une conception dépend de la culture et n’a
rien à voir avec la nature.”).
214. In Hobbes’s state of nature, “The war not only goes on, but fear—that passion to be
reckoned on—is insufficiently sobered with the thought of other men’s power.” S.A. STATE,
THOMAS HOBBES AND THE DEBATE OVER NATURAL LAW AND RELIGION 158 (1991).
215. Rousseau urged,
Above all, let us not conclude with Hobbes that because man has no idea of
goodness, man is naturally evil; that he is vicious because he does not know
virtue . . . . Hobbes saw very clearly the defect of all modern definitions of natural
right; but the consequences he draws from his own definition show that he takes it in
a sense which is no less false.
Rousseau, supra note 193, at 128-29.
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if it ever existed, was a state of peace, not war.216 Rousseau criticized
Hobbes in order to demonstrate that definitions of “natural right”
seldom conform to a “true” idea of nature.217 Rousseau understood
that philosophers tend to dub those elements of social relations that
corroborate their already existing political theories as “natural.”
Similarly, Julie equated the decrees of her father and society with the
218
laws of nature. She unwittingly created an image of nature that
conformed with her life experience. In implicit recognition of this,
Julie eventually embraced the love she had rejected in the name of
219
“nature.”
Rousseau’s immensely successful novel La Nouvelle Héloïse thus
helped to set the intellectual framework in which the French bioethics
debates occurred more than two hundred years later. As the
following discussion will illustrate, his ideas about the complex
interplay between family, nature, and ethics were reformulated in the
rhetoric of the contemporary bioethics debates. Close joint analysis of
Rousseau’s novels and the transcripts of the bioethics debates reveals,
however, that Rousseau’s ideas were greatly transmuted in the
contemporary bioethics debates. Like Rousseau and other
Enlightenment philosophers, the legislators appealed to “nature” to
inform and legitimate their political decisions. But like the
philosophers Rousseau criticized, the legislators seem to have based
ethical judgments on a static vision of nature that reflected the status
quo in order to justify limiting access to ART. A joint analysis of
Rousseau’s novels and the transcripts of the bioethics debates
therefore provides a particularly effective means of both
understanding and critiquing the contemporary legislators’ appeal to
a static vision of “nature” as an ethical guide.
B. Critiquing the Appeal to Nature in the Contemporary Bioethics
Debates
The rhetoric of “nature” and the “natural” was central to the
contemporary bioethics debates, but the words were used as a
justification for what the legislators already believed to be socially

216. See id. at 129 (“[T]his author ought to have said that since the state of nature is that in
which care of our self-preservation is the least prejudicial to the self-preservation of others, that
state was consequently the best suited to peace and the most appropriate for the human race.”).
217. See id. at 128-29.
218. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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right. Medical advances, such as the ability to help post-menopausal
women or homosexual couples have genetically related children, have
caused the questions of the eighteenth century about the relationship
between family, nature, and society to be asked with a new sense of
urgency.220 For instance, Henri Gouhier of l’AcadJmie Française
observed near the end of the twentieth century that:
[t]he word conscience as used by Rousseau suggests the word nature.
Since his insight on the road to Vincennes, Rousseau’s thought
seemed dedicated to a search for a lost nature; and he would not
have been looking for it if he had found it. Now, could it be that the
contemporary crisis of conscience is actually a crisis in the idea of
nature; or, at least, could it be that the crisis in the idea of nature is a
221
component of the contemporary crisis of conscience?

In the face of ART’s potential challenge to the traditional family unit,
society is once again looking to nature for answers to difficult political
and ethical questions: “If we still have such a strong sentiment of the
contemporary relevance of Rousseau’s thought, it is undoubtedly
because he emphasized the relationship between ‘nature’ and
‘culture’ in his philosophical writings . . . .”222
In the minds of the 1994 French legislators, the “cultural crisis”
at hand was the possible transformation of the heterosexual biparental family norm by unrestricted use of ART. Unwilling to ratify
the “possible” as the “natural,” the legislators attempted to institute a
223
certain idea of nature as an ethical arbiter. They used nature as a
limit, a means of erecting controls and ethical boundaries around the
220. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. As Henri Gouhier notes, “If we have such a
strong sense of the contemporary relevance of Rousseau, it is undoubtedly because he
emphasized the relationship between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ . . . .” Henri Gouhier, Preface to
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU ET LA CRISE CONTEMPORAINE DE LA CONSCIENCE 6 (Editions
Beauchenese, 1980) (“Si nous avons le sentiment si vif d’une actualité de Rousseau, ç’est sans
doute parce qu’il a fait passer au premier plan de la philosophie la question des rapports de la
<<nature>> et de la <<culture>> . . . .”).
221. Gouhier, supra note 220, at 5 (“Le mot <<conscience>> sous la plume de Rousseau
appelle le mot <<nature.>> Depuis l’illumination sur la route de Vincennes, la pensée de
Rousseau semble vouée à la recherche d’une nature perdue et qu’il ne chercherait pas s’il ne
l’avait retrouvée. Or la crise contemporaine de la conscience ne serait-elle pas une crise de
l’idée de nature ou du moins la crise de l’idée de nature ne serait-elle pas une des composante
de la crise contemporaine de la conscience? . . . Peut-on se réferer à la nature pour surmonter la
crise de notre culture?”).
222. Id. (“Si nous avons le sentiment si vif d’une actualité de Rousseau, c’est sans doute
parce qu’il a fait passer au premier plan de la philosophie la question des rapports de la
<<nature>> et de la <<culture>> . . . .”).
223. See infra notes 228-35 and accompanying text.
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use of ART. Thus, although the legislators attempted to make a
transfer from nature to ethics like the Enlightenment philosophers,
they seem to have fallen into the trap of conflating the existing social
order for the “natural” order.224 For example, even though it is now
possible for post-menopausal women to bear children, the French
legislature did not accept this option as “natural” and therefore
“right.” The French legislators defined nature as the observable life
processes that existed without the technological interference of
man.225 Consequently, reproduction of heterosexual couples was
deemed “natural,” and therefore permissible, because only fertile
heterosexuals can procreate without the help of ART.
These ideas are manifest in the rhetoric used during the bioethics
debates. For example, on a radio program broadcast on National
Public Radio in 1994, Dr. Jeanne Françoise Jirah, the French Director
General, Ministry of Social Affairs, said this of ART:
The aim is not to create new rights. Bearing a child when you are
older than the usual age, is a new right. Bearing a child when you are
in a couple with another women [sic], it’s a new right. It’s not a
medical choice. It’s a choice by the society itself. What do we want
to do with the scientific and medical progress? Obviously, in France,
the answer by the government, and the parliament, are, “We don’t
want to create new rights, just restore the rights which were
226
diminished by the disease, by sterility, because it made sense to.”

Dr. Jirah seems to have assumed that what is observable
biologically is natural and therefore a “right.” Helping sterile couples
is only restorative, in her opinion, and is, therefore, morally
227
acceptable. In contrast, helping a homosexual couple who would not
be able to have a child without the benefit of technology is a “new”
(read “unnatural”) right. The logic seems to be that since only
heterosexual couples are anatomically equipped to procreate, they
should be the only ones allowed to procreate—even if the technology
exists to enable other couples to give birth, too.

224. Anne Fagot-Largeault, a member of the CCNE, observed that “one does not substitute
an a priori order for the natural order: one fixes the existing order.” Fagot-Largeault, supra note
51, at 201 (“on ne substitue pas à l’ordre naturel un ordre a priori: on raccommode celui qui
existe”).
225. See infra notes 228-35 and accompanying text.
226. Morning Edition: French Government Will Control Who Has Test-Tube Babies
(National Public Radio broadcast, May 5, 1994).
227. See id.
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The assumption that existing biological processes can serve as an
ethical standard is also evident in the text of the French law itself. The
law provides: “Medically assisted procreation is intended to . . .
228
remedy infertility due to pathological conditions . . . .” The law
explicitly states that the technology may only be used if the need has
been medically legitimated.229 Moreover, the 1994 bioethics laws
define ART as the “clinical and biological practices that permit in
vitro fertilization, the transfer of embryos, artificial insemination and
all technology with equivalent effects that enable procreation outside
230
of the natural process.” In other words, ART may only be used to
help a pre-existing biological process that is currently not functioning.
Specifically, it may only be used to help heterosexual couples who are
prevented from procreating because they are sterile.
The legislators explicitly referred to nature as an ethical arbiter
that could help them develop and legitimate the laws during the
parliamentary debates. For example, Madame Françoise de Panafieu
of the RPR referred to the “laws of nature” to support condemning
post-menopausal insemination: “In this proposed law, we have to
take into consideration the interest of the woman. Wanting to force
nature, and wanting someone past childbearing age to procreate at all
231
costs does not conform to that interest.”
This same mode of reasoning surfaced in representative Simone
Veil’s comment:
We can accept to correct nature’s shortcomings, but not going
against nature in allowing, as we have seen recently in Italy, late-life
pregnancies, prejudicial to the child and dangerous to the mother’s
health. We can also not arrange for births of children without fathers
in allowing either the post mortem insemination or implantation of
232
an embryo after the death of a spouse.

228. Law No. 94-654 of July 30, 1994, J.O., July 30, 1994, p. 11,062; D.S.L. 1994, 29, 411
(“L’assistance médicale à la procréation est déstinée à répondre à la demande parentale d’un
couple. Elle a pour objet de rémédier à l’infertilité dont le caractère pathologique a été
médicalement diagnostiqué.”).
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2863 (“[D]ans un texte de loi comme celui qui nous est proposé, nous devons
certes prendre en compte . . . l’intérêt de la femme . . . . Vouloir forcer la nature et faire procréer
à tout prix qui a dépassé l’âge naturel de la procréation, n’est pas conforme à cette
préoccupation.”).
232. Id. at 2743. The original French reads:
On peut admettre de corriger les défaillances de la nature, mais non d’aller à son
encontre en permettant, comme on l’a vu récemment en Italie, des maternités
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Thus, Veil, like Panafieu, seemed to presume that observation of
the life processes pre-existing the invention of ART reveals the
morally superior dictates of “nature.” The “natural,” therefore, as
Rousseau suggested of certain contemporaries, was defined in a way
that merely confirmed what the legislators believed to be socially
“right.”
Mattei likewise used “nature” to justify his exclusion of
homosexual or post-menopausal women from access to ART during
another National Assembly session:
Yes, these procedures have been used for twenty years . . . and
families created from their use. Aberrations have occurred, and they
must be prevented. Therefore, we have wanted to define very clearly
the scope of medical assistance for reproduction: pathological
infertility, medically defined for a couple, a man and a woman who
are living and who give informed consent to insemination or
implantation. In my understanding, this medical procedure is a last
resort, and it is out of the question to accept its use post mortem or
after the age of menopause. Its use would be a corruption of medical
practice, a contradiction of nature, a perversion of the idea of what it
233
is to be a child.

Mattei decries procreative practices that go against his idea of
the traditional family as unnatural “aberrations.” Thus, “natural” for
Mattei also appears to consist of those relationships that he currently
observes and approves of in French society. His definition of nature
represents a rather static view that has been derived from personal
experience, and not the objective norm he purports it to be. Unwilling
to permit the proliferation of other familial models, Mattei excludes
them as unnatural. Thus, Mattei’s reasoning resembles a selective

tardives, préjudiciables à l’enfant et dangereuses pour la santé de la mère. On ne peut
non plus organiser la naissance d’enfants orphelins de père en permettant
l’insémination post mortem ou l’implantation d’un embryon après le déces du
conjoint.
Id.
233. Id. at 2757 (emphasis added). The original French reads:
Oui, cela fait vingt ans que ces techniques s’appliquent . . . que des familles sont ainsi
construites. Des dérives apparaissent, il faut les empêcher. Nous avons donc voulu
très clairement définir le cadre de cette assistance médicale à la procréation:
l’infertilité pathologique, médicalement constatée chez un couple, homme et femme,
vivants et consentants préalablement à l’insémination ou à l’implantation. Dans notre
esprit, cette technique médicale est un recours ultime, et il n’est pas question de
l’accepter post mortem ou passé l’âge de la ménopause. Ce serait un dévoiement de la
médecine, un contresens par rapport à la nature, une perversion de l’idée de l’enfant.
Id.
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reading of Enlightenment ideas: he condones a certain mode of
family that he believes would be beneficial to society, but he supports
this heterosexual norm on the basis of a limited concept of nature that
appears akin to the ideas of thinkers Rousseau criticized.
Thus, the legislators justified limiting access to ART, and
attempted to contain the threat of “reproductive anarchy,” with an
appeal to a rather limited and static view of nature. The legislators
believed that their observation of biological processes pre-existing the
advent of ART could provide an immutable a priori moral order
intuitively accessible to man. The legislators’ arguments echoed
Enlightenment notions of nature’s ability to serve as an ultimate
ethical arbiter, but they reflect a less nuanced view of the dynamic
relationship between nature and ethics than that articulated by
Rousseau. Rather, the reasoning underlying the 1994 bioethics
legislation seems to run directly counter to Rousseau’s caution
against uncritically confounding predominant social customs with the
“natural.”
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: LAW AND LITERATURE
The debate about bioethics is far from complete; it did not end
with the consensus achieved with France’s bioethics laws. In effect,
the French legislation can be understood as a relatively static effort to
hit several rapidly moving targets: family, nature, and ART. As these
targets continue to move, thinking about bioethics issues will also
have to evolve.
Rereading eighteenth-century novels such as Rousseau’s La
Nouvelle Héloïse reveals that literature can play an important role in
this ongoing dialogue surrounding biomedical ethics. As the
discussion in Parts II and III illustrated, Rousseau used the novel as a
means of disseminating various ideas about the relationship between
234
family, nature, and ethics to the public. The concepts of nature and
what forms of human conduct are natural had serious implications for
Rousseau’s characters. Rousseau’s works profoundly affected French
sensibilities about the importance of child-rearing and reproductive

234. “Our lessons can never be useful, unless they are so written as to catch the attention of
those for whose benefit they were calculated.” 4 ROUSSEAU, supra note 139, at xxi. “During the
eighteenth century, one preferred to question the public about problems to which there were as
yet no answers.” McDonald, supra note 5, at 70 (“Au XVIIIe siècle on préférait interroger le
public sur des problèmes auxquels justement on n’avait pas encore de réponse.” (quoting
Michel Foucault, Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?, 309 MAGAZINE LITTÉRAIRE 61, 63 (Apr. 1993))).
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practices to the well-being of society. Thus, Enlightenment thinkers
like Rousseau not only laid the polemical groundwork for the 1994
bioethics debates, but they also bequeathed an invaluable literary
means of conceptualizing and exploring ethical questions.235
Due to legislators’ inherently conservative nature, the work of
lawmaking bodies, while very important, does not provide an
adequate means of comprehensively addressing bioethics questions.
Bioethics questions are continually evolving, but the laws made to
address them have difficulty adapting to rapid technological changes
because they are geared towards protecting existing norms. Harvard
Professor of Romance Languages and Literature Christie McDonald
explains, “[T]he law cannot provide a founding for ethical thought,
because it is designed less to innovate than protect tradition, fitting
principles (philosophical, moral, legal) with facts has seemed like a
236
process of updating in a constantly outdated system.”
The 1994 bioethics laws reflected a static vision of family and
nature that was more in line with protecting tradition than the more
dynamic reality. Constrained by the need to formulate a consensus
235. In fact, contemporary French scientists are themselves turning to literature to help
them grapple with bioethics questions. For example, Henri Atlan, a French biologist who is also
a long-time member of the CCNE, promoted the value of stories to biomedical ethics in a recent
book: “Ethics, virtues, are taught through stories. Learning about good and evil occurs not so
much through philosophy, science or rational analysis of logic, but rather through identification
with situations or individuals.” HENRI ATLAN & CATHERINE BOUSQUET, QUESTIONS DE VIE:
ENTRE LE SAVOIR ET L’OPINION [QUESTIONS OF LIFE: IN BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND
OPINION] 14 (1994) (“L’éthique, la vertu s’enseignent par ces contes-là. L’enseignement du bien
et du mal ne se fait pas tant par la philosophie, la science ou des analyses logiques rationnelles,
que par une identification à des situations ou des individus.”).
French senator Guy Cabanel referred to the parable about biblical prophet Jeremy
Atlan cited in Questions to support disposal of artifical embryos created with ART:
As for the argument that thawing frozen embryos amounts to killing them, I have just
one answer that I found in a recent book by Henri Atlan, and which is in a sense is
the parable of Jeremiah . . . . To those who treat the problem on a moral level, I
would respond, therefore, that children produced artificially in the laboratory are not
the children of God.
Debates, supra note 158, at 3394.
Moreover, Jacques Testart, one of the scientists who helped bring about the birth of the
first French test-tube baby, has started writing novels and stories as a means of exploring the
ethical implications of biomedical research. Testart examined the ethics of using frozen DNA
material to give life to long-extinct species (such as man’s Cro-Magnon ancestors) in a short
story published in Le Monde Diplomatique. See Jacques Testart, La leçon de Cro-Magnon, LE
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Mar. 1994, at 28. Testart also recently published a novel entitled
Simon l’Embaumeur ou la solitude du magicien that addresses the interaction between science
and the media and also criticizes the scientific establishment itself. See JACQUES TESTART,
SIMON L’EMBAUMEUR OU LA SOLITUDE DU MAGICIEN 19-25 (1987).
236. McDonald, supra note 147, at 72.
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and provide set rules for citizens to follow, the legislators drafted laws
that build on the Enlightenment tradition but missed some of the
important nuances of Enlightenment thought. Philippe Lazar,
director of the French biomedical agency INSERM, explained,
Shouldn’t one be afraid that [a bioethics committee takes] the risk of
confiscating the national reflection on those questions which were
submitted to it, by reserving for itself, as they acutely strive to arrive
each time at a good consensus, the debate which constitutes itself
237
the essence of ethical reflection among a group or society.

Arguably, non-consensus and ambiguity form the very heart of
any meaningful ethical discussion. A rereading of Rousseau’s novels
indicates that literature complements the work of legal bodies in
providing a forum where nonconsensus can be maintained so that
ethical questions can be explored more fully. Gary Wihl put it thus,
“As homogeneous standards weaken, the language of the novel
points the way towards a genuinely plural discourse that addresses the
238
same concerns as social theory.” Consensus is antithetical to
literature; the existence of irreconcilable paradoxes and
contradictions form the very basis of literature’s power: “Novels, in
short, are full of perspicuous observations arising from a plurality of
descriptions and a sustaining rather than canceling of ambiguity.”239
Literature, therefore, can provide a freer sphere of ethical reflection
that can be incorporated into the more restrictive legal text. The
evolution of bioethics questions and society’s understanding of them
will be an important, continuing dialogue that will involve legislators,
scientists, ethicists, and historians of science, as well as writers and
citizens.

237. PHILIPPE LAZAR, L’ETHIQUE BIOMEDICALE EN QUESTION 26-27 (1996).
238. Gary Wihl, Novels as Theories in a Liberal Society, in CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM: THE
HUMAN SCIENCES IN THE AGE OF THEORY 101, 101 (Martin Kreisworth & Thomas Carmichael
eds., 1996).
239. Id. at 113.

